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Can growth of a trading partner harm a country? This paper seeks to an-
swer this question through the use of an eclectic trade model which is similar
in avour to Markusen (1986). This paper makes two contributions. First,
it develops a simple and tractable model of international trade based on a
combination of imperfect competition, comparative advantage, and identical
but non-homothetic preferences in a three country framework. Second, it
uses this framework to consider the possibility of losses from partner-country
growth in a free-trading environment. We nd that the presence of nonhomo-
thetic preferences in particular, leads to a home bias in consumption which
dampens any negative welfare e¤ects when a countrys trading partners grow.
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1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, China and India have emerged as the fastest-growing economies
in the world. Their rapid growth has inspired much debate and speculation in
the media. For example, analysts at Goldman Sachs (Wilson and Purushothaman
(2003)) predict that China, the US and India will be the three largest economies in
the world by 2050. This growth in China and India has been fueled by an outward-
orientated economic policy, which has seen export growth in both countries of over
10 percent per year since the 1980s.
This rapid growth has led to fears especially in the US, that China and India
may threaten the livelihood of the people in the developed countries. This sense
of a threat is compounded by recent policy incidents, for example the US tari¤
on steel imports in 2002 and the EUs quota restriction on textile imports in 2005.
These fears were given academic support in Samuelsons (2004) Journal of Economic
Perspectives paper, as well as in an earlier Journal of Economic Literature paper
(Samuelson (2001)), which argued that in a simple Ricardian model of trade based
on technological di¤erences across countries, the US may lose from economic growth
in China if China becomes more similar to the US in terms of its comparative
advantage. This is what we refer to as the Samuelson conundrum: that a country
can be made worse o¤ by changes that occur in its trading partner(s). It poses
a conundrum because it is demonstrably true in the context of the model that
Samuelson (2004) sets out, yet at the same time appears to y in the face of trade
economistsgains from trade result.
It should be stressed that the result in Samuelson (2004) that the US may lose
from growth in China is merely one of several possibilities; Panagariya (2004) has
pointed out that much earlier work by Johnson (1954, 1955) had shown that eco-
nomic growth in a countrymay lead to lower welfare levels for its trading partner(s).
Also, recent work by Jones and Ru¢ n (2005) using a similar framework to Samuel-
son (2004) shows that technological transfer from the US to less developed countries
in its comparative advantage industries may lead to gains to the US rather than
losses. Samuelsons (2004) and Jones and Ru¢ ns (2005) results may be thought
of as reverse immiserising growth of the Bhagwati (1958) type, since in this case
growth in the trading partner may harm or benet the home country, depending
on its impact on the terms of trade.
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In an extended discussion section, Samuelson (2004) argues that the insight
from his simple model can be generalised to richer models. This paper sets out to
perform this generalisation. We develop a three-country model based on increasing
returns to scale at the level of the rm and monopolistic competition, combined
with di¤erences in relative factor endowments and technology across countries, and
non-homothetic preferences. In the interest of keeping the model as simple as
possible, we impose strong assumptions on the technology side along the lines of
Krugman (1981), and we adopt the simplest possible, quasi-linear utility function.
The underlying monopolistic competition model is that of Krugman (1980), based
on the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) framework.
In addition to considering Samuelsons result in a more general framework, this
paper also represents a step forward in developing the eclectic approach of Markusen
(1986). In particular, our setup is much more tractable thanMarkusen (1986) yet re-
tains much of the same avour. Our three-country framework also di¤ers from that
of Markusen (1986) as here our three countries may be di¤erent from one another,
whereas Markusen (1986) focussed on pairs of countries, where countries within
each pair are symmetric to one another. Also, of our three countries, we assume
that two of them are less-developed countries while the third represents a developed
country. This then allows us to explore what happens for example to the rest of the
developing world as China and India experience rapid economic growth. The use of
nonhomothetic preferences in economic models has a long history, dating back to
Linders (1961) work on international trade between rich and poor countries, and
has received empirical validation in Hunter (1991) who showed that nonhomothetic
preferences may account for as much as one quarter of interindustry trade ows.
More recent empirical evidence by Chung (2002) and Dalgin, Mitra and Trindade
(2005) conrms the importance of demand nonhomotheticity in international trade.
The approach used in this paper is also di¤erent from that used in Mitra
and Trindade (2005) and Chung (2003), which both develop models of interna-
tional trade with nonhomothetic preferences. Similarly to Mitra and Trindade but
di¤erently from Chung, our model incorporates nonhomothetic preferences in a
model combining both factor endowment di¤erences and internal scale economies
and monopolistic competition. Unlike Mitra and Trindade, our adoption of quasi-
homothetic preferences means that the model has no implications for the relation-
ship between inequality and trade. We view this as an acceptable tradeo¤ for the
benet of far greater simplicity in our model, and because our focus is on inter-
3
country rather than intra-country interactions.
Our main nding is that the introduction of nonhomothetic preferences and love-
for-variety coupled with increasing returns, leads to additional channels through
which the e¤ects of changes in a trading partner a¤ect a country, in addition to
the terms of trade e¤ect identied by Samuelson (2004). First, nonhomothetic
preferences generate a home bias in demand despite the absence of transport costs,
as the developed country, being relatively abundant in high-wage, high-skill workers,
will also have a greater relative demand for high-income-elasticity goods such as
electronics which are produced by high-skill workers. As a result, the developed
country is insulated to a certain degree from changes in the developing countries.
Second, as the developing countries grow, the increased supply of goods also
implies a larger number of varieties available for consumption. Therefore, whilst
growth in a developing country may improve or worsen the developed countrys
terms of trade through its impact on world relative supply, there will also be a gain
from more varieties because of love-for-variety in consumption, which dampens any
negative terms of trade e¤ects of growth in the developing country. Whilst our
numerical examples in Section 3 show that the developed country never experiences
a welfare loss from the changes in the developing countries, we see these results not
as denitive, but rather as indicative of the forces at work.
The model we present in this paper relates to several strands of literature. As
it uses a monopolistic competition model, it builds on the insights from Helpman
and Krugman (1985). In generating a gravity-type prediction on the volume of
trade, it follows work by Anderson (1979) and Krugman (1979, 1980). And nally,
in discussing international trade between developed and less developed countries,
it is related to the work by Markusen (1986), Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey
(1991), Ramezzana (2000), Matsuyama (2000), Mitra and Trindade (2005), and
Chung (2003), among others.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we
present the structure of the model, starting with the autarkic equilibrium, then
allowing for free trade between the three countries. Section 3 considers the im-
plications for welfare in all three countries when the trading partners experience
economic growth. Section 4 concludes.
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2 The model
In this section we rst describe the autarkic equilibrium of the model, then consider
its implications for free trade in goods but not in labour.
2.1 Autarkic equilibrium
The basic setup of the model is that of a monopolistic competition model developed
from Krugman (1981), with the main points of departure being the use of non-
homothetic preferences and a three-country setup. There are three countries z =
1; 2; 3, and two industries h = 1; 2. Each industry consists of a large number of
products which enter symmetrically into demand. The representative consumer has
the following quasi-linear utility function:
U = lnC1 + C2 (1)










2j 0 <  < 1 (2)
where c1;i is consumption of the ith product of industry 11 and so on2. The value
of  measures the degree of substitutability among products within an industry.
The lower is , the more di¤erentiated are products in the industry. Quasi-linear
utility implies that consumption of products in both industries initially increases
with income, then products in industry 1 have zero income elasticity of demand
above a certain income threshold, beyond which all additional income is spent on
products in industry 2. We assume that consumer income always lies beyond this
threshold. Beyond this threshold, this function is also quasi-homothetic, so that
1A note on terminology: we use goods and industries interchangeably to indicate broad in-
dustry groups, and products and varieties interchangeably to indicate within-industry varieties.
2This formulation of the CES function is slightly di¤erent from the standard one used in
the literature (see e.g. Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999)). It follows the approach used
in Krugman (1980), and generates the same constant-elasticity-of-substitution demand function.
The di¤erence between the two, is that the standard approach allows a simpler derivation of the
price index, hence may be simpler when considering trade barriers. The present formulation is
simpler in the present application where we do not make use of price indices.
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shifting income between agents does not change the total expenditure on di¤erent
industries. This allows us to aggregate individual demands.
Each industry is produced using a specic type of labour, so that there are two
types of labour y = 1; 2. Type 1 labour is used in industry 1 and type 2 labour in
industry 2. Making the labour industry-specic prevents us from considering the
redistribution of labour across industries as parameter values change; however it
does make the model much easier to solve, and in any case sectoral reallocation of
labour is not the main focus of the present paper. There is also substantial evi-
dence that factors of production are not very mobile across sectors; see for example
Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) or Lee and Wolpin (2004). Labour is not specic to
products within each industry. The cost function for any product in each industry
exhibits increasing returns to scale:
l1i = + x1i l2j = + x2j i = 1; :::; n1 j = 1; :::; n2 (3)
where l1i is labour used in producing the ith product of industry 1, x1i is the
output of that product and so on. Because of increasing returns to scale, consumers
preference for variety, and the large number of potential products of each industry,
each rm will produce its own unique product.
Total employment in each industry is equal to the sum of employment in each
product in that industry. Full employment is assumed. The labour force is exoge-












2 = 1 1; 1 > 0 1  21 (4)
where Lzy is the total endowment of labour type y in country z. The parameters 
and  measure the quantity of the di¤erent types of labour. The second constraint
on the parameter values indicates that country 1 has more type 1 labour than type
2 labour. This restriction will be dropped when we consider economic growth later
on; the present notation is extremely exible and will allow us to consider changes
in the three countries without having to introduce additional notation.
Given these conditions, equilibrium in the model is solved in the standard way.
Since all products in an industry enter symmetrically into demand and all rms have
identical cost functions, all products in each industry have the same price. From
the rms prot maximisation problem, and noting that the elasticity of demand is
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where p1i is the price of product i in industry 1 and so on.
Free entry and exit of rms ensures that prots are zero in equilibrium. Com-
bining this zero prot condition and the rmspricing decision allows us to solve
for the output (and hence size) of each rm:




1   = x (6)
Notice that rm sizes are independent of market size. Then the number of rms
in each industry can be obtained by combining the full employment condition with








The number of rms is proportional to the labour endowment. Relative prices and






c 11i = p1i c
 1
2j = p2j
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint or the marginal utility






Equilibrium wages are determined by these prices and the pricing equation (5).
2.2 Free trade equilibrium
In this subsection we consider what happens when we allow three countries to engage
in free international trade in goods but not in labour. Assume identical preferences
across countries and free trade in goods but not in labour between countries. To
determine the pattern of trade between the three countries, we must rst determine
the endowment of the two types of labour in each country. Country 1s endowment
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2 = 3   3
2; 2; ; 3; 3 > 0 2  22 3  23
where as above Lzy is the total endowment of labour type y in country z. The para-
meters  and  measure the similarity of relative endowments across the countries.
For example, if z = 0 for all countries z, then each country has only one type of
labour and hence can only produce varieties of a single industry. If z = z z, all
countries have the same relative endowment ratio. Each countrys total endowment
is given by z.
Given the relationship between the endowment parameters  and , countries
1 and 2 are relatively well-endowed with type 1 labour compared to country 3.
Therefore, Countries 1 and 2 have a comparative advantage in industry 1 and
Country 3 in industry 2. Total world endowment of type 1 labour is equal to
(1   1 + 2   2 + 3) while the total world endowment of type 2 labour is equal
to (3   3 + 1 + 2).
In this model, changes in endowments and changes in technology are identical
in their e¤ects on production but not on their e¤ects on consumption. For example,
whilst doubling total endowments may be caused either by a doubling of the number
of workers, a doubling of labour productivity, or some combination of the two,
changing the number of workers would a¤ect the demand for industry 1, because
of our nonhomothetic preferences, whereas changing labour productivity would not
have any impact on the demand for industry 1, as any additional income will be
spent entirely on industry 2. For the remainder of the paper we hold the number of
workers constant and identical across countries and allow productivity to vary across
countries; therefore, the labour endowments dened above should be interpreted as
e¢ ciency units of labour.
In terms of world trading patterns, the developed countries would be represented
by country 3, which has a comparative advantage (given the constraints on the pa-
rameter values) in highly income-elastic goods such as computer software which are
produced using skilled labour. The less developed countries correspond to countries
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1 and 2, with a comparative advantage in low income elasticity of demand goods
such as food and clothing3 which are produced using unskilled labour. Our speci-
cation allows us to introduce superior technology in the developed countries relative
to the less developed countries.
Since preferences are identical across countries, the prot maximising price is the
same as in equation (5) above. From the rst order conditions for the consumers






where nW1 is the total number of type 1 rms in the world. We normalise p1 = w1 = 1
which implies  = . Prices and wages in industry 2 are pinned down by equation
(10). Free trade in goods implies factor price equalisation across countries, measured
in e¢ ciency units of labour.
From equations (7) and (6), and making use of the assumption that  = , the
total world output of each industry is:
nW1 x = 1   1 + 2   2 + 3 nW2 x = 3   3 + 1 + 2
National incomes Y z are equal to:
Y 1 = 1   1 + w21 Y 2 = 2   2 + w22 Y 3 = 3 + w2 (3   3)
Because of the quasi-linear utility function and identical numbers of consumers in
each country, each country consumes one-third of the world output of each product
of industry 1; that is, total expenditure on industry 1 (and total consumption, given
our normalisation above) in each country is equal to 1 1+2 2+3
3
. Therefore, we
can back out the total expenditure by each country on industry 2 by subtracting
expenditure on industry 1 from national income. Appendix A provides details of
this calculation.
Dening Xzvh as the exports of industry h from country z to country v, we can
compute the exports of each country to the other two countries. Because all varieties
of a good are symmetric, a countrys exports of an industry to another country is
equal to the output of the country in that industry multiplied by the fraction of
3If we abstract from the quality of these goods.
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world output that is consumed in the importing country. For country 1, exports of



















where Ezy is the expenditure in country z of industry y as dened in Appendix
A. Therefore, country 1 exports the same quantity of industry 1 to both countries
because of the quasilinear utility and the assumption of identical numbers of con-
sumers in each country, but exports of industry 2 to the two countries are di¤erent
because national expenditures on industry 2 are determined by national per capita






































Our primary focus is on the welfare implications of changes in the parameter values
for the three countries, but here we briey comment on the observed trade patterns.
Given the parameter restrictions we impose on the endowments, we can see that
countries 1 and 2 export more of good 1 relative to good 2 than country 3. This is
as expected, since the parameter restrictions mean that countries 1 and 2 are well-
endowed with type 1 labour relative to country 3. Similarly, country 3 exports more
of good 2 relative to good 1 compared to the other countries. There is also signicant
bilateral trade within the same industry groups. This comes from the love-for-
variety, monopolistic competition setup; with no trade barriers across countries,
consumers will wish to consume identical amounts of each variety of each good,
irrespective of the country of origin of the variety.
All countries gain from trade in this model. Countries experience greater gains
from trade the less similar they are in their relative endowments, as larger di¤er-
ences in relative endowments imply larger di¤erences in autarkic relative prices,
thus increasing the scope for gains through price changes. Gains from trade are
also larger the lower the degree of substitutability between varieties , as product
di¤erentiation increases and consumers place more weight on variety in consump-
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tion. These are as we would expect, and are in line with the results from Krugman
(1981).
3 Economic growth in the developing world
One of the main economic trends in the world today is the rapid economic growth
of China and India. More generally, the world consists of developed countries and
developing countries. Some of the latter countries are experiencing rapid economic
growth whilst others in this category are not. This section makes use of the exible
framework developed in the previous section to explore the welfare implications of
various types of growth on the di¤erent groups of countries.
We assume that national welfare is simply the sum of individual welfare, mak-
ing use of the quasi-homotheticity of the utility function to allow for aggregation
across individuals with di¤erent income levels. Due to the many interactions in the
model, we focus on graphical representation of the results. It turns out that for the
parameters we use below, in free trade good 2 always has a higher price than good
1 as a result of it being the income-elastic good. This also implies higher wages of
type 2 labour as compared to type 1.
3.1 Analysis
We begin with all countries symmetric to one another in terms of their endowments;
that is, z and z each identical across countries but allowing z and z to di¤er
from one another. Consider rst the implications of allowing the developed country
3 to have superior technology to countries 1 and 2. In our framework, this can
be done by increasing the e¢ ciency units of both types of labour endowment in
country 3 in the same proportion, whilst holding the number of consumers constant.
Figure 1(a) depicts this change, with country 3s technological level doubling. As
expected, superior technology leads to higher welfare in country 3, but it also leads
to (marginally) higher welfare in countries 1 and 2, mainly because the expansion
of production in all sectors in country 3 raises the real income of countries 1 and
2 by reducing the prices of goods (note that in gures 1(a), 1(b) and 1(e), because
countries 1 and 2 are identical to one another, the welfare of countries 1 and 2 are
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identical so that only the welfare of country 2 is visible).
Given the assumption that country 3 is technologically superior to countries 1
and 2, we can explore what happens to welfare in the three countries when several
things happen, holding country 3 unchanged:
1. Technological improvement in countries 1 and 2 in both sectors; technological
catch-up with country 3 (Figure 1(b))
2. Technological improvement only in country 1 in both sectors (Figure 1(c))
3. Technological improvement in only one sector of country 1 (here, consider
sector 1 of country 1) (Figure 1(d))
4. Countries 1 and 2 experience a change in endowments through a shift from
type 1 labour (unskilled) to type 2 labour (skilled); endowment convergence with
country 3 (Figure 1(e))
5. Endowment convergence of only country 1 to country 3 (Figure 1(f))
Figures 1(b) to 1(f) show all of these changes. Table 1 lists the parameter values
for which each gure is drawn; the column headings correspond to nal parameter
values for each gure. What is immediately obvious from these gures is that
country 3 (the developed country) never experiences a welfare loss regardless of what
happens in the two developing countries. This result holds for many alternative
parameter values, but we do not wish to argue that this is a general result; rather,
we use this nding to explore the economic forces at work.
Intuitively, if the change in countries 1 and 2 imply expansion of world relative
supply of good 1, this is a gain to country 3 as it is a net importer of this good, so
its consumers benet from lower relative prices of imports. On the other hand, if
the change in countries 1 and 2 imply expansion of world relative supply of good
2, this benets country 3 as well because it remains the largest consumer of good 2
due to its high per capita income, and expanded world supply of good 2 increases
the number of varieties of good 2 available, hence raising consumer welfare even
whilst its terms of trade erodes as a result of this growth in countries 1 and 2.
In the cases when countries 1 and 2 grow simultaneously and symmetrically
(cases 1 and 4 above, corresponding to gures 1(b) and 1(e)), both growing countries
benet from this change. Clearly, superior overall productivity benets the country,
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as does a shift towards greater endowments of factors which yield output which
have high income elasticity of demand.4 In addition, in the gures, if only one
developing country grows (country 1 in every case) and the other (country 2) does
not, the country that does not grow also experiences a welfare improvement, albeit
a marginal one.
This improvement in the welfare of country 2 when country 1 grows arises be-
cause, if the change in country 1 is such that world relative supply of good 1
increases (e.g. as a result of technological improvement in sector 1, case 3 above or
Figure 1(d)), the welfare gain from the increase in the number of varieties of good
1 available for consumption outweighs the welfare loss from the fall in the relative
price of good 1. On the other hand, if the change in country 1 increases world
supply of good 2 and decreases world supply of good 1, then it turns out that the
gain in welfare from country 2 consumers consuming more of good 2 outweighs the
loss of welfare from the lower consumption of good 1, as a result of the quasi-linear
preferences which place a greater weight on consumption of good 2. There is also a
gain from the increased number of varieties of good 2 available for consumption.
Therefore, there are essentially three forces at work in determining the welfare
e¤ects of any change in the three countries. First, each of the changes leads to
a change in world relative supply of the two goods. This a¤ects world relative
prices and hence real incomes of each of the three countries. Second, there is the
nonhomothetic utility function which leads to a home bias in consumption since less
developed countries are relatively abundant in factors of production which are used
in producing goods with low income elasticity of demand, and these countries also
demand relatively more of the income-inelastic goods, because of their relatively low
per capita income. The third force at work is the love of variety in consumption. An
increase in world supply of a good, implies an increase in the number of varieties
available for consumption, which raises welfare even in the face of declining real
income. The second and third forces act to dampen any possible terms of trade
losses from changes in a countrys trading partners.
4Immiserising growth of the Bhagwati (1958) type does not occur, because no countrys o¤er
curve is inelastic, and factors are not substitutable across industries in production (see Bhagwati,
Panagariya and Srinivasan (1998) p. 377).
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4 Discussion and Conclusions
Can the growth of a trading partner harm a country? This paper seeks to answer
this question by developing a model of international trade between three countries
that takes into account elements of factor endowment di¤erences across countries,
intra-industry trade of the Dixit-Stiglitz type, and non-homothetic preferences. Al-
though the model seeks to capture all of these important features of international
trade, the use of simple and exible functional forms allows us to consider several
di¤erent ways in which countries can grow, and how this growth impacts on the
welfare of both the growing country and its trading partners. Our key result is that
the additional elements of our model relative to Samuelson (2004) generate a home
bias in demand (from nonhomothetic preferences) and a new channel through which
countries gain from trade (from love-for-variety). These additional e¤ects serve to
dampen any negative e¤ects on a country of economic growth in its trading part-
ners. Depending on the parameter values, it may even be the case that countries
can never lose from growth in their trading partners.
Comparing our results to those of Samuelson (2004), when the trading partner
experiences technological improvement in Samuelsons (2004) model in the home
(developed) countrys import-competing good, this harms the home country because
it makes countries more similar and hence reduces the gains from trade which arise
from di¤erences across countries. This does not happen in our model, because
the developed country, having a higher per-capita income, also demands more of
the good which uses intensively its abundant factor. Therefore, when its trading
partners become more similar to it in terms of endowments, the developed country
actually gains from this change because its consumers benet from having more
varieties of the good at lower prices due to the increased supply.
On the other hand, we would get the opposite results if we perform the same
thought experiment as Jones and Ru¢ n (2005). In their paper, the partner country
becomes so good at producing the developed countrys initial comparative advan-
tage good that the developed country switches its production to the other good,
in which it now has a comparative advantage. If the swing in relative comparative
advantage is su¢ ciently large, the developed country may gain from this change.
The equivalent experiment in the context of our model would be the case where
the developed country acquires more of type 1 labour at the same time as the less
14
developed country acquires more of type 2 labour. In this case, the developed coun-
try clearly loses, as its endowment mix shifts towards the low-wage type 1 labour,
reducing national income.
The additional elements of our model improve the implications of developing
country growth on developed country welfare. However, as Jones and Ru¢ n (2005)
note, what may be of concern to governments might not be absolute welfare and
income levels, but welfare and income levels relative to those of other countries.
Economic growth in less developed countries leads to a narrowing of the relative
income gap between rich and poor countries, hence may be a cause for concern in
rich countries even if their absolute welfare increases at the same time.
The use of an explicit three-country framework is also a relatively new develop-
ment in a eld that has been largely driven by two-country frameworks5. In this
case, a three-country approach enables us to explore the interdependencies between
countries when their trading partners grow. There exists the possibility of conict
between countries, as changes in one country may impact on other countries in
di¤erent ways depending on the structure of each countrys economy. This again
appears to be consistent with the conicts in international trade that have been
observed between di¤erent countries.
5See for instance Markusen and Venables (2004) for a discussion of the limitations of the
two-country approach.
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5 Appendix A: National expenditures on good 2
This Appendix provides the algebraic expressions for the national expenditures on
good 2. Dene national expenditure of country z on industry 2, Ez2 as national
income less expenditures on industry 1. Then, this may be written as:
E12 = Y
1   E11 = 1   1 + w21  





f21   21   2 + 2   3 + 3w21g
E22 = Y
2   E21 = 2   2 + w22  





f22   22   1 + 1   3 + 3w22g
E32 = Y
3   E31 = 3 + w2 (3   3) 





f23   1 + 1   2 + 2 + 3w2 (3   3)g
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1(b) 1(c) 1(d) 1(e) 1(f)
1 2 2 2 4 4 3.5 2 2
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 1.5 1.5
2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2
2 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.5
3 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
3 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Table 1: Parameter values for Figure 1
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Figure 1(b): Doubling country

































Figure 1(d): Doubling country




















































Figure 1: Utility under the various cases
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